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ON THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF EVENTS OF ZERO 
PROBABILITY 
 
ASAD ZAMAN1
 
ABSTRACT. A logically consistent way of maintaining the events of probability zero are 
actually impossible is presented. 
 
Consider a random variable X uniformly distributed on the unit interval 
[0,1]. For any x ε [0,1], the probability that X=x is zero, and yet one of 
these events must occur. This appears to preclude interpretation of an 
event of probability zero as an impossible event. Several authors of 
elementary probability texts comment on this puzzling situation. Levi 
(1980) argues from this that events of probability zero may nonetheless be 
‘seriously possible’. The object of this note is to present a logically 
consistent way of maintaining that events of probability zero are impossi-
ble. 
We first present an analogy with the Axiom of Choice. Let Ei, i = 
l,2,..., be a countable collection of sets. Let Sibe the statement “Ei is 
not empty”. The axiom of choice states that if for each i, Si is true, then the 
infinite conjunction of them is also true. It is important to note that while 
the meaning of the infinite conjunction (i.e. the simultaneous truth of all of 
the sentences) is easily understood intuitively, it is not a sentence 
according to the usual rules of logic, which permits only finite combi-
nations of sentences. It is possible to introduce a new primitive sentence 
equivalent in meaning to the infinite conjunction. However, as logicians 
have discovered, this sentence is not logically entailed by the truth of each of 
sentences Si. More precisely, a man who believes each Si to be true while 
maintaining that the infinite conjunction of them is false will not arrive at 
a logical contradiction (unless his counterpart who believes the infinite 
conjunction to be true can also arrive at a contraduction). A lucid 
presentation of this and related matters is available in Cohen (1966). This 
phenomenon (Si is true for each i while the infinite conjunction is false) 
is called ω-inconsistency (where ω stands for the first infinite ordinal). Let 
Q(x) be the sentence “X will take the value x”. For any subset S of [0,1], 
define the disjunction Q*(S) = ∨xεS Q(x). In equating the probability of an 
event with the possibility of the same event, we are asserting that Q*(S) is 
false for any set of (outer) probability zero, while it is true for any set of 
(inner) probability one. As explained earlier, this is not a logically 
inconsistent position, despite appearances. It is, rather, Ω-inconsistent, where 
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Ω is the first ordinal with the cardinality of the set [0,1]. Since subsets of 
cardinality less than Ω must have probability zero, it is clear that 
inconsistency will not arise for such collections of sentences. The air of 
paradox arises because of our implicit supposition that Q*([0,l]) 
logically entails the truth of one of the statements Q(x). This is not true 
unless we assume Ω-consistency, which is a rather strong axiom. 
On reflection, it appears quite plausible to display Ω-inconsistency in this 
situation. We are prepared to assert, for any fixed x ε [0,1], that we will not 
observe the event X=x regardless of how many (up to a countable number of) 
repetitions of X we observe. Thus it is reasonable to believe Q(x) to false for 
any x, while not denying the truth of Q*[0,l]. 
The perceptive reader will observe that by rejecting Ω-consistency we have 
avoided logical inconsistency at the stage prior to observing X. After observing 
X=x0 we appear to face the difficulty of having to change the truth value of 
Q(xo) from false to true. This problem can be avoided by proper 
interpretation of the event X=xo. We continue to maintain that Q(x0) is false, 
but now regard the disjunction Q*([x0 — ε,xo + ε]) as being true for any value 
of ε > 0. This gives us a logically consistent identification of probability 0 
with impossibility, and also demonstrates once again the pitfalls of 
intuitive reasoning about infinities. 
In conclusion, we remark that the above interpretation permits a clarification 
of the logic of the method of maximum likelihood. We seek to find a 
parameter value which maximizes the likelihood of the observed event. When 
the observed event X=xo is regarded as Q(X0), this does not make sense as 
stated (with continuous variables), and must be justified heuristically. 
However, it does make sense to ask for a parameter value maximizing the 
probability of event Q*([xo — ε,x0 + ε ]) for ε small. This is the logic of the 
method of maximum probability estimators, due to Weiss and Wolfowitz 
(1974). 
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